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IF OBSCENITY WERE TO DISCRIMINATE
Barry P. McDonald*
In her thoughtful essay, When Obscenity Discriminates,1 Professor
Elizabeth Glazer argues that First Amendment obscenity doctrine, as it relates to portrayals of gay and lesbian sex (―gay sex‖), violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and, somewhat paradoxically,
the First Amendment itself. More specifically, Professor Glazer appears to
make a three-pronged argument. First, current obscenity doctrine leaves
open the possibility that, in application, juries or judges might find gay sex
portrayals obscene simply because they involve same-sex acts (as opposed
to obscene acts). Second, this possibility in turn encourages censorship of
sexual expression involving gay sex by private actors. Finally, in view of
the Court‘s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,2 the obscenity doctrine violates
the Equal Protection Clause by causing such private discrimination, and also violates the First Amendment because such discrimination is directed
against the viewpoint that gay sex is equally as acceptable as heterosexual
sex.
While Glazer‘s thesis is creative and provocative, she does not address
critical legal and empirical problems with her argument. The first is the notion that existing constitutional doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court can itself be unconstitutional because it might be applied in a manner that
violates other constitutional doctrines. While such applications of a doctrine might be unconstitutional if they were to occur, that does not render
the doctrine itself unconstitutional. The next problem is her idea that potential unconstitutional applications of a doctrine that purportedly encourage
private actors to discriminate render the doctrine itself unconstitutional. If
solely private actors commit the ultimate discrimination, then there is no
state action to support a claim of constitutional violation.
Finally, there are significant empirical deficiencies with Glazer‘s argument. She concedes there is little evidence that juries or judges actually
apply the obscenity doctrine against gay sex portrayals in a discriminatory
manner. Thus, she bases her claims of constitutional violation on alleged
*
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1
Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1379 (2008) (link).
2
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that adults have a substantive due process right to engage in consensual sex with members of the same sex in the privacy of their own homes) (link).
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discrimination by private parties. But even here, Glazer attempts to make a
case of private discrimination by focusing on the actions of just two private
entities—the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and
Google—where her ―proof‖ of discrimination involves highly anecdotal or
limited information, which fails to establish anything definitive. Moreover,
Glazer provides no evidence to tie the allegedly discriminatory behavior of
these two entities to the obscenity doctrine, relying instead on bare assertions that the doctrine‘s treatment of gay sex portrayals causes such ―collateral effects.‖3
This Essay develops these criticisms of Professor Glazer‘s essay. Part
I discusses the lack of a sound legal or empirical basis for arguing that the
obscenity doctrine is unconstitutional due to its claimed discriminatory collateral effects. Part II examines Glazer‘s argument as it might properly
have been made: that if the discriminatory application of the obscenity doctrine against gay sex portrayals were to become an issue, the demands of a
principled and coherent jurisprudence would require the Court to revisit that
doctrine in light of Lawrence to clarify that the gay or lesbian nature of
such portrayals is not a constitutional basis for deeming expression to be
obscene. I conclude that Glazer would have a strong argument in this regard, but one that relies primarily on basic equal protection and First
Amendment principles rather than on any changes wrought by Lawrence.
I.

OF DISCRIMINATION AND EMPIRICAL SUPPORT

A. The State Action Requirement for Constitutional Violations
Three basic interpretations of Professor Glazer‘s thesis appear possible,
as suggested by the following statements she makes, respectively, in her introduction and in her conclusion: ―Part IV elaborates the obscenity doctrine‘s discrimination against gays and lesbians on both equal protection
and First Amendment grounds;‖4 and ―The collateral effects of the obscenity doctrine‘s current application have discriminated against gays and lesbians. Further, by so discriminating, the collateral effects of the doctrine
have violated the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment itself.‖5
The first possible interpretation, based on the statement from her introduction,6 is that Professor Glazer believes the obscenity doctrine, and in
3
To be sure, in her Essay, Professor Glazer also appears to make a normative argument about the
influence of the law on societal norms and how a potential reading of the obscenity doctrine to permit
same-sex discrimination might undesirably encourage private actors to discriminate against content involving gay sex (and perhaps against gays and lesbians generally). Such an argument would certainly
be defensible on social and legal policy grounds, but it is not the one on which Glazer chooses to make
her principal stand.
4
Glazer, supra note 1, at 1386.
5
Id. at 1433.
6
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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particular the three-part test set out by the Court in Miller v. California,7 is
unconstitutional in light of Lawrence.8 But it is unusual to argue that a current doctrine of the Court interpreting the First Amendment violates contemporaneous constitutional doctrines that interpret the same or other
Amendments.9 The Court presumably formulates its doctrines with others
in mind, and while there might at times be unresolved tensions and inconsistencies among them, to select one of them and label it unconstitutional
seems jurisprudentially incorrect. If perceived tensions between Lawrence
and Miller were put squarely to the Court, it might choose the former as requiring modification rather than the latter (versus the other way around, as
Glazer would have it). The point is that any tensions and uncertainties that
might exist between new and old doctrines do not create an unconstitutional
doctrine (or more appropriately a non-constitutional doctrine) until the
Court identifies one as no longer constituting good law.
The second possible interpretation of Glazer‘s thesis, based on the
statement from her conclusion referenced above,10 is that alleged applications of the obscenity doctrine by juries and judges in a way that discriminates against portrayals of same-sex acts (i.e., an assertion of discriminatory
enforcement or, at the least, disparate impact) are unconstitutional. But
Glazer appears to disclaim such an argument by virtue of her repeated assertions that modern obscenity prosecutions are relatively rare, and that the
obscenity doctrine is in ―disuse‖11 and has ―disappear[ed] from courts‘
dockets.‖12
Perhaps this is why Glazer focuses on alleged ―collateral effects‖ of the
obscenity doctrine on private actors. She seems to argue principally that the
unconstitutionality she asserts derives from the fact that the doctrine leaves
open the possibility of discriminatory applications of the facially-neutral
7

413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (―(a) whether ‗the average person, applying contemporary community
standards‘ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value‖) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)) (link).
8
See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1419–33.
9
It is also an unusual argument because the Miller test is facially-neutral on the subject of homosexuality; in providing criteria for what sexual expression is obscene or not, it makes no distinctions
whatsoever between heterosexual and homosexual sex acts. See supra note 7.
10
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
11
Glazer, supra note 1, at 1382.
12
Id. at 1383; see also id. at 1382, 1384, 1402–04, 1432–33. Professor Glazer appears to be correct
about the dearth of modern obscenity prosecutions. See generally, e.g., Jason Krause, The End of the
Net Porn Wars, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2008 (discussing the decline of federal obscenity prosecutions). Nevertheless, she suggests that the doctrine had earlier been applied against gay sex in a discriminatory manner by certain appellate courts—including the United States Supreme Court. See Glazer, supra note 1,
at 1399–1402. However, none of the ―evidence‖ for this proposition that Glazer cites—the appellate
court opinions and remarks by Professor William Eskridge—truly support it. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Miller test,13 which in turn induces private actors to discriminate against gay
content.14 If, however, Glazer is arguing that the obscenity doctrine itself is
unconstitutional because of possible unconstitutional applications of it, this
simply does not fly. The application of a constitutional doctrine in a way
that violates other constitutional provisions does not make the doctrine itself unconstitutional. One would have to argue, as Glazer does not, that the
doctrine itself is unconstitutionally vague because it admits of unconstitutional applications—an argument that would be subject to the same objections lodged above that one constitutional doctrine of the Court cannot
violate another one of its contemporaneous doctrines.
But Professor Glazer takes her argument even further, arguing that the
obscenity doctrine is unconstitutional because potential discriminatory applications of it by juries or judges has the collateral effect of inducing actual
discrimination by private parties. This creates an additional problem.
Where is the state action necessary to support a constitutional violation if
the doctrine itself is not unconstitutional, there are no unconstitutional applications of it by government actors, and any actual discrimination is
committed by private parties?15 Of course, the only way for Glazer to properly make this argument is to demonstrate how those private parties themselves can qualify as state actors under the exceptions to that doctrine
recognized by the Court.16 However, she raises this issue solely as to one
private actor she discusses but promptly abandons it, stating simply that
―with respect to an assessment of the obscenity doctrine‘s collateral effects,
it is unnecessary to determine the status of the MPAA.‖17 But why is this
so? Especially if one is going to later conclude, as noted above, that ―the
collateral effects of the doctrine have violated both the Equal Protection
Clause and the First Amendment itself.‖18 The bottom line is that unless
Professor Glazer can demonstrate how the MPAA or Google can be considered to be state actors (which seems highly unlikely), any reliance on their
alleged discrimination against gay content to prove a constitutional violation, even if it was somehow induced by the obscenity doctrine, is misplaced.

13
The Miller test is facially neutral in the sense that it does not make sexual orientation the basis for
determining what expression is obscene. See supra note 7.
14
See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1432–33 (―The [obscenity] doctrine‘s refusal to distinguish between
sex and sexual orientation has left open the possibility that content can be classified as obscene because
it is either more naked, or, in the alternative, because it is more gay.‖).
15
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.4.1 (3d
ed., 2006) (―The Constitution . . . generally does not apply to private entities or actors.‖).
16
See, e.g., id. § 6.4.4.1 (discussing the ―public functions‖ and ―entanglement‖ exceptions).
17
Glazer, supra note 1, 1405. Glazer then proceeds to discuss the significant influence the MPAA
has on the distribution of movies but never relates that discussion back to the recognized exceptions to
the state action doctrine. See id. at 1405–08.
18
Id. at 1433.
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B. Empirical Problems
Assuming Professor Glazer could make a tenable argument that the
collateral discrimination she describes provides the basis for a constitutional
violation, the evidence she presents for such discrimination is unpersuasive.
To begin, although not absolutely vital to her argument since she focuses on
the possible discriminatory application of the obscenity doctrine as fostering collateral discrimination, it is noteworthy that Glazer provides little evidence that juries or judges discriminate against gay sex portrayals in the
first place. Although she discusses a couple of state appellate court cases
where gay sex portrayals were held to warrant obscenity-related convictions, Glazer does not actually claim that these decisions (much less the underlying convictions) were the product of bias against same-sex acts.19
Indeed, she forthrightly concedes that ―an honest account of the obscenity

19

See id. at 1400–01. And nor would an examination of those decisions support such an assertion.
See Tipp-It, Inc. v. Conboy, 596 N.W.2d 304 (Neb. 1999) (no reference by court in its Miller analysis to
homosexuality being the basis for a finding of obscenity); State v. Millville Video, Inc., No. CA99-10179, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4192 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2000) (videotape of acts between both homosexual and heterosexual couples deemed to meet the Miller guidelines with specific emphasis on the
sadomasochistic nature of the acts rather than the same-sex nature). Glazer also cites to certain Supreme
Court decisions and Professor William Eskridge‘s remarks on them to suggest that the obscenity doctrine had been applied in a discriminatory manner against gay sex in the past. See Glazer, supra note 1,
at 1400–01. However, these citations do not support such a proposition. None of the decisions Glazer
relies on indicate that the Court found materials to be obscene because of their homosexual nature, and
Professor Eskridge‘s statements claiming such discrimination are either bare assertions or are not supported by the cases he relies upon. Compare William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1036–39 (2005) (citing and
discussing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (link), and Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977)
(link)) with Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 (in a case involving various heterosexual and homosexual images, the
Court does not even acknowledge the homosexual nature of the images much less make that a basis of
its decision) and Ward, 431 U.S. at 773 (in a case involving sadomasochistic materials, the Court did not
reveal whether they involved heterosexual or homosexual acts, much less make their homosexual nature
a basis of its affirmation of the lower courts‘ findings of obscenity).
It should be noted that in Tipp-It, 596 N.W.2d at 312, the Nebraska obscenity statute at issue in that
case did label homosexual acts as one among other types of acts, including ―sexual intercourse,‖ that
could qualify as being obscene (were it to meet other parts of the Miller test). However, as noted above,
the court essentially ignored this fact when applying that test to find that three gay images among twenty-two displayed in a gay bar were obscene. See Tipp-It, 596 N.W.2d at 307, 312–15. One might argue
that, by singling out ―homosexuality‖ for potentially obscene treatment, the law itself constitutes evidence of the type of discrimination against gay sex claimed by Glazer. However, Glazer herself does
not make this argument, presumably for two reasons. First, the Nebraska law, by including ―sexual intercourse‖ and ―prolonged physical contact with a person‘s clothed or unclothed genitals,‖ appeared to
be taking a ―shotgun‖ approach to defining sexual acts that could qualify as obscene if they were sufficiently prurient and offensive. See Tipp-It, 596 N.W.2d at 312. Accordingly, the law did not appear to
be discriminating against gay sex as such. Second, Glazer represented to this author that her research on
laws defining what sexual acts could qualify as obscene under Miller revealed that they generally did not
single out homosexual acts. E-mail from Elizabeth M. Glazer, Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra
University School of Law, to Barry P. McDonald, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University
School of Law (May 30, 2008, 9:08 a.m. PST) (on file with author).
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doctrine‘s history must reflect the fact that not all cases involving depictions of homosexuality have ended badly.‖20
Nonetheless, Glazer concludes that ―[o]bscenity‘s past and present
suggest that the doctrine has failed to distinguish between content that is
obscene because it contains too much sex, and content that is obscene because it contains representations of gays and lesbians.‖21 Although the little
evidence Glazer sets forth could ―suggest‖ virtually anything, it certainly
does not establish a pattern of discrimination against gay sex portrayals in
the application of the obscenity doctrine by juries and judges.22 She appears
to concede this by noting repeatedly that modern obscenity prosecutions are
few and far between,23 and by focusing on alleged collateral effects of such
discrimination instead of that discrimination itself (despite the fact that the
latter, of course, would have provided a much stronger basis for Glazer‘s
constitutional claims).
As for those discriminatory collateral effects, the evidence here is just
as weak as the evidence supporting Professor Glazer‘s allegations of discrimination by the courts. Glazer focuses on the actions of two private parties to make her case: the MPAA and Google. With respect to the MPAA,
the evidence of its discrimination against gay content because of its gay nature consists mainly of anecdotal statements of film industry ―insiders‖ and
very general comparisons of the ratings received by films containing heterosexual sex scenes versus those containing gay sex scenes.24 Once again,
Glazer forthrightly concedes that ―[i]t is surely possible that the MPAA
rated the films whose scenes this section highlights with a particular rating
for reasons other than the sexual orientation of its characters.‖25
As to Google, Professor Glazer ran searches of the phrase ―having sex‖
on Google Images using three different SafeSearch Filtering programs
Google offers to ―exclude[] most explicit images from Google Image
Search Results‖26—a ―strict‖ filtering option, a ―moderate‖ filtering option,
and no filtering at all. She asserts that of the first twenty images her
searches returned, the strict setting returned four depicting sex (all four involving heterosexuals), the moderate setting returned eight depicting sex
(all eight involving heterosexuals), and the no filtering setting returned
twelve depicting sex (eight involving heterosexuals and four involving homosexuals). From these results, Glazer suggests that Google has a ―Gay
Filter,‖ as the heading of her section asserts. Putting aside the puzzling silence on what all of her search results returned (and not just the first twen20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Glazer, supra note 1, at 1401.
Id. at 1402.
See supra notes 12 & 19 and accompanying text.
See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1382, 1384, 1402–04, 1432–33.
See id. at 1408–11.
Id. at 1408.
Id. at 1410 n.206 (omission in original).
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ty),27 all Glazer has shown is that a particular search on one of Google‘s
numerous search engines, using different settings of its filtering software,
returned homosexual sex images solely under the unfiltered option while returning some heterosexual sex images under all of the filtering options.
While it is possible that Google‘s filtering software screens out gay sex
content, it is also possible that these results can be accounted for by a number of other plausible explanations—such as the possibility that the homosexual images searched by Google‘s engine were more explicit than the
heterosexual images it searched (a major feature targeted by the filters).
But in any event, Glazer candidly concedes that it is impossible to know
whether Google Image‘s complex software algorithms are designed to filter
gay sex content.28
To be sure, Glazer openly disclaims any intent to have this one search
―experiment,‖ or her discussion of MPAA film ratings, establish with any
certainty that either Google or the MPAA discriminate against gay sex content because of its gay nature.29 But at the same time she makes several
statements to the effect that she is ―offering and analyzing data that seek to
demonstrate [systematic] biases against homosexual content in two major
media,‖30 and also argues generally that the obscenity doctrine is in fact unconstitutionally producing discriminatory collateral effects—presumably on
the basis of her MPAA and Google ―data‖ since she offers no other evidence of such discrimination. Glazer cannot have it both ways. Either she
must construct an argument that is consistent with the notion that her ―evidence‖ of collateral discrimination is, at best, suggestive despite its highly
speculative nature, or she must produce sounder and more comprehensive
evidence of such discrimination on which to base her claims of constitutional violation.
Finally, and even more problematically, Glazer offers no evidence that,
even if some important private actors discriminate against gay sex content
because of its gay nature, they are doing so as a result of anything the obscenity doctrine has to say on that matter.31 As noted earlier, that doctrine
27
Of course, the exclusion of the remaining images completely distorts any statistical inferences
Glazer attempts to draw, even at this very crude level of empirical analysis.
28
See id. at 1409 (―[S]ome search engine algorithms are so complicated that determining why a
computer made a particular decision to filter some content, but not other content, may be impossible.‖).
29
See id. at 1402, 1403, 1408, 1409, 1411.
30
Id. at 1403; see also id. at 1404, 1405, 1407.
31
Once again, the closest Professor Glazer comes to providing such evidence are some unsupported
assertions by Professor William Eskridge that the vagueness of the Miller framework has caused discrimination against gay sex content. See id. at 1404 & nn.173–74. Although in the passage relied on by
Glazer, Eskridge asserts that ―after Miller v. California[, 413 U.S. 15] (1973) some communities banned
lesbian or gay romances as well as oral and anal sex,‖ he provides no citations to support that assertion
and, most importantly, no evidence linking such actions, even if they were motivated by an antihomosexual animus, to the Miller decision (particularly since Miller involved heterosexual and homosexual pornography, and not the regulation of ―romances‖ or physical sex acts themselves). See
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 202–04 (2002).
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is neutral on the issue of whether the homosexual nature of sexual expression makes it more or less obscene. Thus, Glazer is forced to argue that the
mere possibility that juries or judges will discriminate in applying the Miller
test encourages private actors to treat gay sex portrayals more restrictively
than heterosexual ones. To state the argument is to reveal its tenuousness.
Even assuming enough private actors are aware of one obscure aspect of a
concededly ―disused‖ legal doctrine, to create the ―implicit yet pervasive‖32
societal discrimination Glazer alleges, it is a much further stretch to infer
discriminatory causation from it. It seems much more plausible that if actors like the MPAA and Google engage in such discrimination, it simply
stems from their independent determinations (however much Glazer would
argue they were misplaced) that gay sex content is particularly inappropriate for minors (in the case of the MPAA ―R‖ ratings, which Glazer
claims discriminatorily excludes such content),33 or for both minors and
adults that might be using Google Images in its normal default setting of a
―moderate‖ filtering option.34 This is especially true considering that, as
private actors, neither the MPAA nor Google need to concern themselves
about claimed constitutional violations from treating gay sex content differently than heterosexual sex content. It is not as if they need legal cover to
discriminate, assuming they actually do, by relying on obscenity doctrine to
claim that gay sex portrayals are inherently obscene and, thus, can or should
be more heavily restricted.
In sum, although Glazer‘s arguments regarding the obscenity doctrine‘s unconstitutionality are creative, unless she can lay a firmer foundation for state action and the empirical claims she makes, those arguments
would be substantially strengthened by recasting them into less ambitious—
but no less productive from her viewpoint—claims that I will discuss in
Part II.
II. THE LAWRENCE EFFECT
Professor Glazer makes two arguments as to why Lawrence renders the
obscenity doctrine unconstitutional. First, from an equal protection standpoint, that decision lays down a ―broad equality principle‖ mandating ―that
the obscenity doctrine cannot weigh one‘s sexual minority status when implementing the Miller test.‖35 Second, from a First Amendment perspective,
because the Lawrence Court‘s attitude towards gay sex shifted from viewing it as a disfavored subject to a viewpoint that sees it as ―simply another
way that individuals might engage in sex . . . , obscenity‘s discrimination
against gays and lesbians constitutes a constitutionally impermissible view32
See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1385 (―The collateral effect of failing to distinguish gay and lesbian
content from obscenity has been an implicit yet pervasive sanctioning of the censoring of gay content.‖).
33
See id. at 1404–08.
34
See id. at 1410–11.
35
Id. at 1419.
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point-discriminatory restriction on speech.‖36 Since I have already argued
that Glazer‘s claims of unconstitutionality go too far, I will take the liberty
of recasting these arguments as more modest claims that the obscenity doctrine needs to be modified in light of Lawrence in order to achieve a principled and coherent constitutional jurisprudence as it relates to the Court‘s
treatment of gay sex (including expressions of it). Presumably, the modification urged by her would be one making clear that the gay nature of sex
portrayals is an illegitimate factor for juries or judges to consider in applying the Miller test.
I conclude that Glazer‘s equal protection argument has some merit to
the extent it suggests that such a modification would be warranted if the issue of obscenity discrimination against gay sex portrayals were demonstrated to be a real problem. But unlike Glazer, I see this as an issue of the
interplay of basic equal protection and First Amendment principles—and
specifically the prohibition against content discrimination—rather than an
extension of equal protection principles from Lawrence. I also conclude
that Glazer‘s First Amendment viewpoint discrimination argument misconceives the nature of that doctrine, its application in this context, and the
relevance of Lawrence to this issue. Instead of arguing that obscenity discrimination against gay sex portrayals would constitute impermissible
viewpoint discrimination pursuant to changes wrought by Lawrence, Glazer
would do better to rest her argument squarely on the content discrimination
principles I discuss in Part A below.
A. Of Lawrence, Equal Protection and First Amendment Principles
With respect to her equal protection argument, in what Glazer concedes is a ―broad interpretation‖ of Lawrence, she argues that the decision
stands for the proposition that homosexual persons have an ―equal right . . .
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.‖37 As translated into the domain
of assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on sexually-explicit expression, Glazer argues that this principle demands the Court alter the Miller
test to prevent any ―conflation of sex and sexual orientation.‖38 Glazer‘s argument essentially raises the question of whether the Court would determine that such a modification to, or clarification of, the Miller test was
called for in light of Lawrence.
Lawrence was a substantive due process decision where the Court held
that the state lacks a sufficient interest to punish consensual sexual activity
between homosexual adults conducted in the privacy of the home.39 Miller
and its companion case of Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,40 on the other
36
37
38
39
40

Id.
See id. at 1416 n.247 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1422.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–79 (2003) (link).
413 U.S. 49 (1973) (link).
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hand, addressed a state‘s ability to prohibit, consistent with the First
Amendment, the public distribution or movie theatre exhibition of pornographic media. The Court justified its rulings that the state could so prohibit materials adjudged to be obscene under the Miller test by reference to
the protection of minors, the sensibilities of unwilling viewers, and, in the
case of movie theatre exhibitions where exposing minors or unwilling
viewers might not be a problem, the right ―to maintain a decent society.‖41
In other words, with respect to materials that, in the words of Miller, are
considered by an average person of a community to be designed to appeal
to a prurient or lascivious interest in sex and contain ―patently offensive‖
depictions of it,42 both individual and societal interests in avoiding exposure
to, or having the community affected by, public dealing in them outweighs
an individual‘s right to distribute or receive them. Most pertinently, the
Miller-Paris Adult Theatre framework grants members of a given community a qualified right to say what sexual materials are unduly lascivious and
offensive when they enter public channels of distribution,43 while Lawrence
says that the public has an insufficient interest in making similar determinations about intimate sexual acts that take place in private.44
The question that follows is whether Lawrence places constraints on a
community‘s ability, in exercising its qualified right to control public dealings in extremely offensive materials, to define portrayed sex acts as unduly
lascivious and offensive at least in part because they involve homosexual
conduct. One response might be that if a given community is allowed to
determine for itself what materials are too lascivious and offensive to be
traded publicly, it is difficult to see why, if gay sex portrayals are inherently
lascivious and offensive in its eyes (perhaps because there is a very low incidence of it within that community and it is viewed as ―abnormal‖), it
should not be allowed to make that determination. Under Miller, the argument would go, such judgments are allowed to be inherently subjective and
41

Id. at 59–60 & n.10, 69 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court in Paris Adult Theatre also
implied that the preservation of public morality and the prevention of antisocial conduct were additional
grounds for banning the public distribution of obscene materials. See id. at 57–62. And, of course, the
Court assesses all of these interests in relation to its view that obscene ―utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.‖ Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20–21 (1973) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (link).
42
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24–25.
43
I say ―qualified‖ because before a work can be deemed legally obscene, a judge must, under Miller‘s third prong, also find that it, taken as a whole, lacks serious value. See id. This prong has been
interpreted to require as a reference a national standard, as opposed to the standards of a given community. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 11.3.4.2. Accordingly, this prong effectively prevents a
community—especially a conservative one—from finding materials obscene that the nation generally
would say had some serious artistic or literary value.
44
Accordingly, the analog to Lawrence in the obscenity arena is not Miller or Paris Adult Theatre,
but rather the Court‘s decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (link), where it held that the
mere private possession of obscene materials could not be criminalized consistent with the First
Amendment.
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democratic, and Lawrence does not change that basic proposition as to public dealing in pornographic materials. On the other hand, it could be argued
that the respect and dignity owed to the personal decisions of gays and lesbians about their private sexual conduct extend equally to the commercial
(in most cases) production, distribution, or consumption of gay pornography, even within a community that does not generally accept such homosexual practices. Further, the argument would continue, if a community
tolerates a certain level of heterosexual pornography, then should it not be
forced to accept a similar level of gay sex pornography as well? Does it, in
light of Lawrence, unconstitutionally demean gays and lesbians by permitting the former but criminalizing the latter?
As mentioned above, Lawrence was a substantive due process case
while the most appropriate claim here is one of equal protection as to First
Amendment rights—i.e., the ability to distribute or receive gay sex expression ―on a par‖ with heterosexual sex expression. It should be noted, however, that Lawrence did contain strong overtones that, at least as to the issue
of private, consensual adult sex, gays and lesbians were entitled to equal
protection with respect to criminal laws seeking to regulate such conduct.45
Does such a principle extend into the realm of ―determining obscenity?‖
As a basic question of equal protection law, the Court‘s decision in Romer
v. Evans46 appears to be the most apposite case. There the Court declined to
treat sexual orientation as a suspect classification warranting the application
of formal heightened scrutiny to alleged discrimination against gays and
lesbians, but did apply a form of ―heightened‖ rational basis review to hold
that laws imposing special disabilities on gays and lesbians were generally
illegitimate—and in particular when such laws appear to have been motivated by nothing but animus towards those groups.47
Does the ―obscenity discrimination‖ claimed by Professor Glazer run
afoul of this principle? This is debatable. As noted earlier, the Miller test
does not single out gays or lesbians for disfavored treatment—any discrimination of the sort at issue here would be a case-by-case determination by
juries or judges about lasciviousness and offensiveness. However, one
could argue that if a jury or judge were to single out gay content for obscene treatment simply because of its gay nature, this would be imposing a
special disability on gays or lesbians. But would such discrimination be the
result of a bare animus towards those groups? Is offensiveness the same
thing as animus? Certainly not in all cases. One can be offended by things
people do without disliking or hating them as well. Similar reasoning applies to determinations about prurience. Nonetheless, there is certainly
some tension between the Romer principle and such discrimination.

45
46
47

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003) (link).
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (link).
See id. at 631–32.
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In any event, it appears that a different line of equal protection principles—based not on the suspect status of the differential treatment of gays
and lesbians but instead on whether alleged discrimination unduly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right—may be more pertinent to this issue. The Court has held that when the differential treatment of groups impairs unduly the exercise of a fundamental right, that treatment is subjected
to strict scrutiny and generally held to be unconstitutional.48 This raises the
question of whether the alleged discrimination in ―determining obscenity‖
may be said to unduly impair the exercise of a fundamental right. In Lawrence, the Court declined to characterize the right to engage in private, consensual sex acts as a fundamental right, although it treated the asserted
liberty interest as one deserving of an unspecified form of heightened scrutiny.49 As noted earlier, the liberty interest being asserted in the obscenity
context implicates First Amendment concerns: the right to distribute and receive gay sex content on a par with heterosexual sex content. Does such an
interest implicate fundamental rights?
Certainly the Court has held that the right to send or receive protected
expression is a fundamental liberty interest under the First Amendment.
And even with respect to making determinations about the protected or unprotected status of pornographic materials, at least in the prior restraint context, the Court has held that substantial First Amendment interests are
implicated—for example, placing the burden of proof and other procedural
burdens on a state censor as to whether pornographic films are obscene.50
Thus it seems that the Court would also be likely to treat the ―determining
obscenity‖ problem in the subsequent punishment context as also implicating important First Amendment interests. Assuming this to be the case,
then, would the Court also believe that the alleged obscenity discrimination
against gay sex portrayals unduly interferes with such First Amendment
rights?
To answer this question, we must look to the central First Amendment
principle disfavoring content discrimination by the state, which rests largely
upon equal protection principles in any event (thus demonstrating that these
two bodies of law overlap to a significant extent).51 Of course, when the
government discriminates against protected expression on the basis of its
content, the Court normally applies strict scrutiny and holds the discrimination to be unconstitutional (the basic idea being that it is not the government‘s place to judge the worth or value of various expression).52 When
such discrimination occurs with respect to unprotected expression, the
48

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 10.1.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–79.
50
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This principle against content discrimination is consistent with the Court‘s treatment, in the basic
equal protection context of differential classifications that impair the exercise of a fundamental right.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 10.1.
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Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul53 essentially followed the same approach
with the exception of recognizing that content discrimination that does not
present a ―significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination‖54 is generally unobjectionable. But what about content discrimination that occurs
within the process of determining whether certain expression is protected or
unprotected under standards defined by the Court? Of course this very
process inherently involves content discrimination, but the question here is
whether the ―second-level‖ content discrimination that would occur if a jury
or judge were to determine that sex materials were unduly lascivious or offensive because of their homosexual nature would offend the principle
against content discrimination generally.
As to this question, we might look at the extent to which such secondary content discrimination would implicate the concerns animating the general content discrimination prohibition, as well as the extent to which such
secondary discrimination might be justified by the reasons that have traditionally permitted an exception to the general prohibition as to obscene content. Although the Court and commentators have asserted different
justifications for generally disfavoring content discrimination by the government,55 I have argued previously that the principal one is a concern that
the government would engage in such discrimination to censor views, ideas,
or information for illegitimate reasons56—in this case, suppressing gay sex
content out of mere distaste or animus instead of attempting to mitigate
harms from it the government can legitimately seek to address.
But what is that harm in the context of obscenity regulation? As discussed earlier, the Court allows publicly distributed pornographic content to
be discriminated against on the basis of the level of its lasciviousness and
offensiveness. Those reasons have to do with the low ―truth‖ value of extreme pornographic material and its potential harm to societal interests in
shielding youths, adults and the greater community from conduct and materials that threaten society‘s interests in preserving minimum levels of decency and morality.57 This raises the question of whether gay sex content
implicates these concerns to a significantly greater degree than similarly
pornographic heterosexual content. In other words, would a jury or judge
act legitimately in censoring gay sex content because of these concerns
while giving a ―pass‖ to heterosexual fare that was similar, or even ―worse,‖
in terms of lasciviousness or offensiveness? It seems not. Smut is smut,
and in terms of the obscenity-related harms the government can legitimately
seek to address, it appears to make little difference whether such materials
53
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involve heterosexual or same-sex actors. In this context, there would also
be a significant risk that such discrimination might frequently be based on a
mere distaste or animus towards gay or lesbian behavior versus a legitimate
concern about harms that might be caused by the public distribution of obscene material generally.
Accordingly, there is a strong argument that equal protection and First
Amendment principles prohibit the sort of claimed discrimination in applying obscenity doctrine which concerns Professor Glazer. Thus, if this became an issue for the Court, it very well might be willing to modify the
Miller test to clarify that the homosexual nature of a gay sex portrayal is not
a legitimate factor for a jury or judge to consider in determining whether it
was unduly lascivious or offensive under that test. However, in my view,
such a clarification has less to do with Lawrence and more to do with the
application of basic equal protection and First Amendment principles to this
relatively narrow point of law.
B. Of Lawrence and Viewpoint Discrimination
Professor Glazer also argues that Lawrence marked a transformation in
the Court‘s attitude towards gay sex, from viewing it as a questionable subject (e.g., an ―odd‖ practice) to a viewpoint that it is just another way for
people to have sex. And ―[o]nce homosexuality so transforms, discrimination against content in light of its homosexuality‖ constitutes viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.58 Glazer‘s underlying
premise is that if the Court viewed the alleged discrimination against gay
sex portrayals as mere subject matter discrimination it might not violate that
Amendment since the Court has been inconsistent in its views as to whether
the content discrimination principle prohibits subject matter discrimination.
On the other hand, she argues, the Court has been clear that viewpoint discrimination violates that principle.
Setting aside the issues of whether the Court truly had or has such
views about gay sex and whether such a transformation occurred in Lawrence (both of which seem highly debatable), this argument is problematic
for another reason. Assuming one could equate the Court‘s attitude towards
gay sex conducted in private with the commercial production and distribution of gay pornography (another proposition that seems highly debatable),
under First Amendment doctrine whether the Court itself views certain expression as merely pertaining to a subject or also embodying a viewpoint is
largely irrelevant. The question is whether, in the context in which it occurred, the government actors that allegedly discriminated against certain
expression did so because of its subject matter or because of viewpoints it
may have reflected. Accordingly, with respect to Glazer‘s alleged discrimination, the question would be whether juries or judges purportedly finding
gay sex portrayals to be unduly lascivious or offensive because of their gay
58
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nature, were doing so because they were hostile to the basic notion of homosexual sex or because they were hostile to a perceived viewpoint reflected in such content that gay pornography was just as acceptable as heteroheterosexual pornography. It would likely be some of both. So it is not
clear that it matters whether such discrimination is characterized to be on
the basis of subject matter or viewpoint. But even if it were mere subject
matter discrimination, I cannot agree with Glazer‘s premise that there is a
significant question as to whether it would violate the content discrimination principle. Unlike the older cases on which Glazer bases her argument,59 in recent decades the Court has been fairly clear that subject matter
discrimination by the government is equally as problematic as viewpoint
discrimination even if it reserves its strongest rhetoric for the latter: ―Regulation of the subject matter of messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based regulation, is also an objectionable form of content-based
regulation.‖60
Ultimately, then, as discussed in Part II.A., I agree with Professor
Glazer‘s thesis to the extent it suggests there is a strong argument that gay
sex obscenity discrimination by juries or judges, were it to exist, would
constitute impermissible content discrimination. But I part ways with her
argument that Lawrence affects this calculus due to a purported shift in the
Court‘s attitude towards gay sex. In my view, Lawrence has little relevance
to this issue. Finally, even if that decision was relevant, Glazer‘s argument
regarding viewpoint discrimination ignores the complexities, discussed
above, that such alleged discrimination would be occurring within a process
that inherently calls for content discrimination by government actors. This
would not be an issue, as Glazer seems to portray it by her heavy reliance
on R.A.V.,61 of content discrimination within a category of expression that
had already been determined to lack First Amendment protection.
CONCLUSION
In her essay, Professor Glazer makes a creative and intriguing argument that the obscenity doctrine is unconstitutional because of the discriminatory collateral effects it purportedly generates. While this Essay has
discussed several legal and empirical problems with this argument, it has
concluded that her core insight—that the Miller obscenity test should be
applied in a manner that is neutral as to the sexual orientation of the perti59
See id. at 1391–93 (discussing cases from the 1970s when content discrimination principle was
first emerging). Many of the cases examined by Glazer also involved the government regulating speech
in special capacities—such as postmaster, property proprietor, or the military—where greater content
discrimination is generally allowed by the Court (and especially on the basis of subject matter categories) as opposed to when the government regulates speech in its capacity as general sovereign. See
McDonald, supra note 55, at 1350 & n.5.
60
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (link).
61
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nent actors—appears to have substantial support in basic principles of the
Court‘s equal protection and First Amendment jurisprudence.
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